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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT:
FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW APPLIES TO STATE
ELECTION CONTRIBUTION LIMITS, ALLOWING THE COURT
TO APPLY A SPECIAL TYPE OF FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000)
I. FACTS
Shrink Missouri Government PAC (Shrink), one of two respondents,
is a political action committee.' Respondent Zev David Fredman (Fred-
man) was the Republican nominated candidate for the 1998 Missouri
State Auditor position.2 Shrink contributed $1,025 to Fredman's com-
mittee in 1997 and another $50 in 1998.3 Shrink, a conservative advo-
cacy group, donated the funds because it believed that Fredman was the
only candidate who represented its political views.4
In 1994, the Missouri Legislature had passed a statute that restricted
the permissible amount of financial contributions a person, organization,
or committee could give to candidates running for state office. 5 In
1. Brief for Respondents at 4, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (No. 98-
963). A political action committee (PAC) is an "organization established by businesses, labor unions,
and other interest groups in the United States to channel financial contributions into political cam-
paigns. PACs solicit contributions, pool the funds, and make donations to the campaigns of candidates
for national, state, and local offices." Encarta, Encyclopedia on the Web, at http://encarta.msn.com/
(January 30, 2001).
2. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 383 (2000); see also Erin Buford Vinett,
Case Note, First Amendment-Campaign Finance Reform-The Supreme Court Halts the Eighth
Circuit's Invalidation of State Campaign Contribution Limits, 23 U. ARK. LrrnLE ROCK L. R EV. 243, 246
n. 11 (2000) (stating that Shrink suggested to Fredman that he run for the State Auditor position).
3. Nixon, 523 U.S. at 383.
4. Vinett, supra note 2, at 246 (citing to Respondents' Brief at 17, Nixon (No. 98-963)); see also
Dean N. Fugate, Case Note, Enforcing the Speech Limit: Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
32 Loy. U. CHi. L. J. 205, 221 (2000).
5. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 382; see also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001). Before
the statute became effective, the voters of Missouri had passed a ballot initiative entitled Proposition A,
which limited contributions to smaller amounts and also put limits on expenditures. See Respondents'
Brief at 3, Nixon (No. 98-963). The Attorney General of Missouri ruled that the proposition would
supercede the statute passed by the Missouri Legislature. Id. In 1995, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held the expenditure limits in the initiative unconstitutional for violating the First
Amendment. Id. ; see also Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422, 1429 (8th Cir. 1995). In
another case, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found the initiative's contribution limitations
unconstitutional for similar First Amendment violations. See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 645 (8th
Cir. 1995) (holding that contribution limits of $100 to $300 were not sufficiently tailored to prevent
corruption or the appearance of it, and finding that Missouri's statute violated the Constitution by
infringing on a campaign contributor's First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and association).
The court added that the 1994 statute would now go into effect. See id. at 642-43, 645 (holding that
Missouri had "no evidence as to why the Proposition A limits of $100, $200, and $300 were selected
[and] ... no evidence to demonstrate that the limits were narrowly tailored to combat corruption or the
appearance of corruption associated with large campaign contributions"); see also Respondents' Brief
at 3, Nixon (No. 98-963).
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1997, the statute was amended 6 and imposed contribution limits from
$250 to $1,000, depending on the specific state office and size of
constituency. 7  Shrink and Fredman sought to stop enforcement of the
contribution statute. 8  They claimed that the statute violated their First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights.9  Specifically, they claimed that the
statute violated the rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association,
and equal protection.lO Shrink stated that without the limitation of the
1997 amended statute it would have contributed more to Fredman's
campaign.11 Fredman believed that he could have campaigned more
effectively if he had received larger contributions than the statute
allowed. 12
The district court, on a motion for summary judgment, sustained the
statute. 13 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 14 It
applied a strict scrutiny test, which meant that in order for a state to pass
a contribution limitation, the state must prove that it has both a
"compelling interest" and that the means are "narrowly tailored" to
the goal desired.15 That court stated that it did not find Missouri's
proposed interest in avoiding corruption, or the appearance of it,
sufficient.16 It stated that even though the Supreme Court in Buckley v.
Valeo17 found corruption in 1972, Missouri had the obligation to show
that the same problems currently existed in Missouri.18
The court then examined the second prong of the strict scrutiny
test: whether the contribution limits were sufficiently tailored to curtail
6. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 2001).
7. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 382. The statute read: "to elect an individual to the office of governor,
lieutenant governor .... state auditor or attorney general, the amount of contributions made by or
accepted from any person other than the candidate in any one election shall not exceed one thousand
dollars." See id. (examining Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.032(1)). When this case was filed, contribution
limits ranged from $275 to $1,075. See id. at 383 (stating that limits ranged from $275 for contributions
to candidates for state representatives or for any office with a constituency fewer than 100,000 to
$1,075 to candidates for statewide office including state auditor and for any office where the
population was greater than 250,000 people).
8. Id. at 383.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 741-42 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (holding that
there was enough support for the idea that generous contributions raised suspicions of influence and
undermined citizens' confidence in the integrity of the government, and that the limitation amount was
not unconstitutional under the federal standard even when failing to take inflation into account).
14. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 520 (8th Cir. 1998).
15. Id. at 521.
16. Id. at 522.
17. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
18. See Shrink, 161 F. 3d at 521-22 (stating that the only evidence of corruption was an affidavit
by a state legislator).
310
CASE COMMENT
corruption or the appearance of it. 19 It found that the limits were
constitutionally fatal because when compared to the limits in Buckley
they were simply "too low to allow meaningful participation in protect-
ed political speech and association." 20 Given that many states limit
campaign contributions, 21 the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari 22 in order to analyze the Eighth Circuit's decision to
apply the federal standard to the state level.23 The Supreme Court held
that the statute did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 24
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of the people to
peaceably assemble." 25  In 1971, Congress passed an "intricate
statutory scheme" 26 known as the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA).27 The Court has had difficulty deciding how to analyze cam-
paign finance laws because while some justices find that speech, associa-
tion, and equal protection are the primary constitutional interests
associated with such laws, others find that the laws have implicated only
property interests. 28
19. Id. at 522.
20. Id. at 523 (quoting Day v. Halahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1366 (8th Cir. 1994)).
21. See generally EDWARD D. FEIGENBAUM & J AMEs A. PALMER, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,
CAMPAIGN FiNAcE LAW 98 (1998).
22. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 525 U.S. 1121, 1121 (1999).
23. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 337, 385 (2000).
24. Id. at 396-97.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1976).
27. Id. at 13. The 1971 Act was amended in 1974. Id. at 6.
28. See id. at 58-59 (holding that the FECA's expenditure restriction is unconstitutional on First
Amendment freedom of speech grounds). Justice White, dissenting, compared the expenditure restric-
tion to property-oriented restrictions such as compulsory bargaining, taxation, antitrust laws, and
general price controls. Id. at 262-63.
2001]
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A. BUCKLEY V. VALEO
The core case from a progeny of cases, which developed the test
that regulates the FECA as well as most campaign finance reform that
implicates the First Amendment, is Buckley v. Valeo. 29 Buckley dealt
with four broad issues raised by the FECA: individual contribution and
expenditure limitations, 30 public disclosure laws of certain contributions,
public funding for presidential campaigns, and the establishment of the
Federal Election Commission (FEC).31 The issues relevant to this legal
analysis deal primarily with the first section of that opinion, 32 particu-
larly with the analysis of the individual contributions 33 and expenditure
restrictions. 34
The Court found that these restrictions "operate in an area of the
most fundamental First Amendment activities [because they affect the]
29. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1), (3) (Supp. IV 1974). This is a provision of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3 as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
88 Stat. 1263 (limiting contributions by individuals to any single candidate for federal office to $1,000
per election).
31. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 145-46 (citing the FECA at 2 U.S.C. § 431(e) (Supp. IV 1974)).
[A] "contribution" (1) means a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of
money or anything of value made for the purpose of-(A) influencing the nomination for
election, or election, of any person to Federal office or for the purpose of influencing the
results of a primary held for the selection of delegates to a national nominating
convention of a political party; or (B) influencing the result of an election held for the
expression of a preference for the nomination of persons for election to the office of
President of the United States; (2) means a contract, promise, or agreement, expressed or
implied, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contribution for such purposes;
(3) means funds received by a political committee which are transferred to such
committee from another political committee or other source; (4) means the payment, by
any person other than a candidate or a political committee, of compensation for the
personal services of another person which are rendered to such candidate or political
committee without charge for any such purpose...
2 U.S.C. § 431(e) (Supp. IV 1974).
34. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 147-48 (citing the FECA at 2 U.S.C. § 431(0 (Supp. IV 1974)).
[An] "expenditure" (1) means a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance,
deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made for the purpose of-(A) influencing
the nomination for election, or the election, of any person to Federal office, or to the
office of presidential and vice presidential elector; or (B) influencing the results of a
primary election held for the selection of delegates to a national nominating convention
of a political party or for the expression of a preference for the nomination of persons
for election to the office of President of the United States; (2) means a contract, promise,
or agreement, express or implied, whether or not legally enforceable, to make any
expenditure; (3) means the transfer of funds by a political committee to another political
committee...
2 U.S.C. § 431(f) (Supp. IV 1974); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 381-82
(2000) (stating that an issue in Nixon was whether Buckley's contribution guidelines applied to state
candidates).
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[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candi-
dates [which] are integral to the operation of the system of government
established by our Constitution." 35 To determine whether the expendi-
ture and contribution limitations of the FECA violated the First Amend-
ment, the Court first decided which test to apply. 36
The Court began by finding that the United States v. O'Brien37
test,38 known as "intermediate scrutiny," was not an appropriate test 39
because the contribution and expenditure limitations in the FECA were
not the same as the limitation on conduct that was upheld in O'Brien.40
There was a distinction between the scrutiny in O'Brien and Buckley
because spending money is not the same type of conduct as destroying a
draft card.41 The Court explained that some communication derived
from money involves only speech, some involves only conduct, and
some involves both.42 The Court added that the Constitution applies
most to conduct of campaigns for political office.43 Rather than apply-
ing the O'Brien test or "time, place, and manner regulations," the Court
in Buckley looked to develop a new test.44 It began this process by
examining exactly how contributions and expenditures restrict speech.4 5
35. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
36. Id. at 16.
37. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
38. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The test is:
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it... furthers an important or substan-
tial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on [the] alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id.
39. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16. The lower Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
applied O'Brien scrutiny because it found that contribution and expenditure restrictions were not
infringements on speech but rather regulated non-speech conduct. Id. The court found that the
restrictions had only an incidental effect on speech and that the law did not restrict speech any more
than was necessary. Id.
40. Id. The Court also expressly stated that the similar standard of review applied to "time,
place, and manner restrictions" did not apply. Id. at 18 (stating that there is an important difference
between picketing and a newspaper column because picketing was conduct intertwined with both
association as well as expression, but the newspaper was pure expression involving pure speech with-
out conduct). The Court stated the principal difference between "time, place, and manner restric-
tions" and the law in Buckley was that this law imposed "direct quantity restrictions of political
communication and association." Id.; see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965) ("It is, of
course, undisputed that appropriate, limited discretion, under properly drawn statutes or ordinances,
concerning the time, place, duration, or manner of use of the streets for public assemblies may be
vested in administrative officials, provided that ... discretion is exercised with uniformity ... free
from.., discrimination ... and.., consistent.").
41. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
42. Id
43. Id. at 14-15.
44. Id. at 14-22. The Court needed a new test because rational basis, intermediate, and tradition-
al strict scrutiny did not fit the unique infringement on speech that contribution and expenditure
restrictions triggered. Id.
45. Id. at 19.
2001]
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First, the Court distinguished expenditures in a campaign from
contributions to a campaign.4 6 It found that a limitation on how much a
person or group could spend on measures to communicate a message
directly decreased the "quantity of expression." 47 It stated that this was
because communication in today's world required spending money. 48
On the other hand, it stated that limiting contributions does not substan-
tially impair the expression of political speech. 49 The Court found that
reducing the amount of money a group or person can contribute does
not directly reduce communication because the contribution is "sym-
bolic expression" that does not prevent the person or group from
promoting candidates or issues. 50
The Court also stated that there was an important difference between
contribution and expenditure restrictions when analyzing them under the
freedom of association guarantees.51 It found that contribution restraints
were less of a burden on this freedom than restrictions on expendi-
tures. 52 It reasoned that while expenditure limitations would impede an
association's ability to extend its message, a contribution restriction does
not, to the same degree, deter speech. 53 A contribution restriction does
not deter speech because it does not prevent the contributor from becom-
ing a member of any association or helping a candidate personally. 54
The Court, before proceeding into further examination of contribution
and expenditure limitations, concluded that while both limitations in-
volved First Amendment interests, expenditure restrictions were more
severe.55
Next, the Court developed a special First Amendment test for
contribution limits. 56 It stated that even though limits on the right to
associate will be analyzed under the strictest scrutiny, 57 the right to
associate is not absolute. 58 This special test stated "[e]ven a 'significant
interference with protected rights of political association' may be
sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and
46. Id. at 19-20.
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id
49. Id. at 21.
50. Id. at 21-22.
51. Id. at 22.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 23.
56. Id. at 25.
57. Id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)).
58. Id. (citing CSC v. Letter Carriers 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973)).
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employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of
associational freedoms." 59
The Court took the above stated test and first examined the three
proposed interests offered by the government to determine if those
interests were sufficient. 60 The main purpose of the FECA, the govern-
ment argued, was the "prevention of corruption," whether real or
imagined.6 1 The two secondary interests proposed were: (1) to equalize
the citizen's ability to affect the outcome of the election 62 and (2) to
stop the expanding amount of money being spent in the elections and
therefore open access to elections to more candidates with less money.63
The Court stated that the two ancillary interests need not be exam-
ined because the proposed main interest was sufficient in itself.64 The
Court found this interest sufficiently important because the problem of
corruption, whether real or perceived, was not "illusory." 65 Also, the
danger of "quid pro quo arrangements" as well as the danger to "fair
and effective government" was enough to qualify it as a sufficiently
important interest. 66
The Court then examined Appellants' 67 argument that both bribery
laws and disclosure laws were less restrictive means of discouraging these
"quid pro quo arrangements." 68 In rejecting this argument, the Court
stated that bribery laws only focused on the "blatant and specific"
examples of those arrangements and that Congress should be given
leeway to deal with the reality or appearance of corruption. 69 The Court
found that the FECA's contribution restrictions did not "to any material
degree" discourage communication of candidates or issues. 70
The Court then looked at the issue of whether the provisions chal-
lenged in the FECA utilized means closely drawn to the FECA's
objectives. 71 It acknowledged that when a donor made a large donation
that did not mean the donor intended to influence the candidate;
59. Id.
60. Id. at 25-26.
61. Id.
62. Id. This was done by limiting the effect the wealthy could have in the election process. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 26.
65. Id. at 27.
66. Id. (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
67. The Appellants were a diverse group of individuals and organizations; they included a candi-
date for the U.S. Presidency, a U.S. Senator who was seeking re-election, a potential contributor, the
Committee for a Constitutional Presidency, the New York Conservative Party and the New York Civil
Liberties Union, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party, the American Conservative
Union, the Conservative Victory Fund, and Human Events, Inc. Id. at 7-8.
68. Id. at 27.
69. Id. at 27-28.
70. Id. at 29.
71. Id.
2001] 315
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however, it was difficult to isolate "suspect contributions." 72 Therefore
Congress was justified in its conclusion that the link from contributions
to direct action was complex if not, in many instances, impossible to
prove. 73 It also found that a $1,000 restriction was not unreasonably low
because Congress did not have to fine tune the amount.74
The Court also examined the expenditure constraints that the FECA
imposed. 75 The Court found that neither the main interest offered by
the government, curtailing corruption or the appearance of it, nor the
secondary interest, "equalizing" the influence of individuals and
groups, was sufficient and struck down the expenditure limitations. 76
The interests were insufficient to justify the expenditure restriction
because the restriction "preclude[d] most associations from effectively
amplifying the voice of their adherents" and at the same time interfered
with their freedom of association, thus creating a more significant
restraint than contribution limitations.77
Chief Justice Burger, who concurred in part and dissented in part,
stated that he would strike down the contribution limitations for the same
reason that the majority struck down the expenditure restrictions.7 8 He
argued that the contribution limitations were too restrictive. 79 He sug-
gested that both contribution and expenditure limitations would, in
certain circumstances, restrict the same political activity.80
Justice White, in a separate concurrence, asserted that what the FECA
restricted was not speech, but rather money.81 Like Chief Justice Burger,
he found the majority's reasoning "strange" when it distinguished
contribution restrictions from expenditure restrictions.8 2 He stated:
Let us suppose that each of two brothers spends $1 million
on TV spot announcements that he has individually prepared
and in which he appears, urging the election of the same
named candidate in identical words. One brother has sought
and obtained the approval of the candidate; the other has not.
72. Id. at 29-30.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 30. The Court noted the lower court's comment that "a court has no scalpel to probe,
whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000." Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519
F.2d 821, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court went on to state "[s]uch distinctions in degree
become significant only when they can be said to amount to differences in kind." Id.
75. Id. at 39.
76. Id. at 49-51. The Court's decision was based on the same reasoning it used to distinguish
expenditures and contributions. Id. at 19-23.
77. Id. at 22-23 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)).
78. Id. at 235 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 243.
81. ld at 259-60 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 261.
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The former may validly be prosecuted under [section] 608(e);
under the Court's view, the latter may not, even though the
candidate could scarcely help knowing and appreciating the
expensive favor.83
Justice White stated that he did not perceive any distinction between the
two, at least for "constitutional purposes. ' ' 84 He would have found
that, like contribution limitations, expenditure limitations were also
constitutional. 85
B. DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING BUCKLEY
Since the Buckley decision, the Court has explicitly reiterated and
clarified that different standards govern contributions and expenditures
by holding that "restrictions on contributions require less compelling
justification than restrictions on independent spending." 86 The Court
has extensively examined the application of the different standards in
cases since the ruling in Buckley.87
1. Federal Election Commission v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee
In Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political
Action Committee,88 the Supreme Court for the first time took up the
issue of whether 26 U.S.C. § 9012(0,89 which limited expenditures by
PACs, was constitutional.9 0 National Conservative Political Action
83. Id.
84. Id. Justice White stated that it did not make sense to limit the amounts an individual may give
to a candidate but not limit the amount that candidate can spend. Id. The candidate will recognize the
money spent on his behalf whether he knows of how it was spent or not. Id.
85. Id. at 266.
86. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387 (2000).
87. See infra Parts II.B.1-4.
88. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
89. Fed. Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. at 491 (citing Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub.
L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 563 (1971) (codified as amended 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9013 (1974)). This sec-
tion was part of the FUND Act that, like the FECA, regulated presidential campaigns. Id. "The
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act (Fund Act), 26 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq., offers the Presidential
candidates of major political parties the option of receiving public financing for their general election
campaigns." Id. at 482. Section 9012(0 stated:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any political committee which is not an authorized committee
with respect to the eligible candidates of a political party for President and Vice Presi-
dent in a presidential election knowingly and willfully to incur expenditures to further the
election of such candidates, which would constitute qualified campaign expenses if
incurred by an authorized committee of such candidates, in an aggregate amount
exceeding $1,000.
Id. at 491.
90. Id. at 491-92.
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Committee (NCPAC) was a political committee that solicited funds for
former President Reagan's 1984 presidential reelection. 91
The Court found that PACs were entitled to just as much First
Amendment protection as individuals.92 The Court employed Buckley in
support of this premise. 93 It made the analogy that a PAC is to a
supporter of a candidate as an amplifier is to a speaker in a public hall.94
The point being that pooling of financial resources increased speech the
same way an amplifier extended the message of a public speaker.95
The Court then examined the purpose behind § 9012(f), which was
to curtail potential corruption, and found that the fact that PACs
typically spend more money than individuals did not consequently mean
that their potential for corruption was greater.96 The Court stated that
"hypothetically," even if PACs were linked to corruption, § 9012(f) was
still overbroad because it would restrict large scale PACs' contributions
the same as contributions from smaller casual dialogue groups. 97 Thus,
the Court held that § 9012(f) was unconstitutionally overbroad and
therefore violated the First Amendment.98
In his dissent, Justice White again criticized Buckley. 99 He stated
that he thought Buckley was wrongly decided because limitations on
both contributions and expenditures were supported by a valid govern-
mental interest. 00 He argued that, "[t]he First Amendment protects the
right to speak, not the right to spend." 101 He asserted that giving money
to an organization was not identical to speech.102 This, Justice White
found, was because there is an important difference between spending
your own money on a candidate and giving your money to someone
else to spend on like political views.10 3
91. Id. at 490-91.
92. Id. at 496.
93. Id. at 493 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 497-98 (stating that the Court was never informed of what the "corruption" consisted
of).
97. Id. at 498.
98. Id. at 501.
99. Id. at 507 (White, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (stating again that the interest mentioned was real or apparent corruption). Justice White
would have found that § 9012() resembled the contribution statute challenged in Buckley, and
therefore he would have upheld it. Id. at 508.
101. Id. (stating also that he could not "accept the identification of speech with its antecedents"
because such a method could "be used to find a First Amendment right to a job or to a minimum wage
to 'produce' the money to 'produce' the speech").
102. Id. at 513.
103. Id.
[VOL. 77:309
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He agreed with the majority that expenditures in this case did
"produce" speech but that they did only that, "produce" it.104 This
was different from actually being speech. 105 Justice White stated that he
also followed the majority's view in that it was difficult to differentiate
between "1,000 $25 contributions and .. . 100,000 $25 contributions,"
but that this was the reason § 9012(f) was not overbroad.106
2. Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc.
In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
Inc.,10 7 the Court held that an expenditure must constitute "express
advocacy" to be scrutinized under § 441b of FECA.108 The Court
examined the issue of whether a corporation's publication and distribu-
tion of a newsletter, urging readers to vote pro-life in an election, was
"express advocacy" and thus violated § 441b of the FECA.109 This
section prohibited direct expenditure of corporate funds in connection
with election to public office. 110 The Court also questioned the constitu-
tionality of § 441b as applied to Massachusetts Citizens for Life
(MCFL). 11
104. Id. at 508.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 516 n.I1.
107. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
108. Fed. Election Comm'n, 479 U.S. at 249. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(2) states in part:
[T]he term "contribution or expenditure" shall include any direct or indirect payment,
distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services, or anything of
value (except a loan of money by a national or State bank made in accordance with the
applicable banking laws and regulations and in the ordinary course of business) to any
candidate, campaign committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any
election to any of the offices referred to in this section, but shall not include
(A) communications by a corporation to its stockholders and executive or
administrative personnel and their families or by a labor organization to its
members and their families on any subject;
(B) nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a
corporation aimed at its stockholders and executive or administrative
personnel and their families, or by a labor organization aimed at its
members and their families; and
(C) the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a
separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a
corporation, labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or
corporation without capital stock.
Federal Election Campaigns Disclosure of Federal Campaign Funds, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 90 Stat. 490
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(2) (1980)).
109. Fed. Election Comm'n, 479 U.S. at 249.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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The Court found that the "Special Edition" publication by MCFL
did "expressly advocate" and thus violated § 441b.112 Then the Court
analyzed whether the statute was constitutional as applied to MCFL.113
The Court asserted that when a statute inhibits speech it must be justified
by a "compelling state interest." 114 It asserted that the proposed
interest, a broad rule preventing all corporations from corruption or the
appearance of it, was not enough.115 Therefore, the Court held that the
section violated the First Amendment in this case because Congress
lacked a compelling justification for it. 116
3. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
Federal Election Commission
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal
Election Commission (Colorado I),117 the Court for the first time re-
viewed expenditure restrictions against parties. 118 The Court faced the
question of whether 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3), a provision of the FECA
passed in 1971 and amended in 1974, which limited expenditures by
PACs, was constitutional as applied to the case.119
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (CRFCC)
bought radio advertisements attacking a congressman. 120 The Federal
Election Commission (FEC) brought a complaint against CRFCC for
violating § 441a(d)(3). 121 The Court stated that the interest put forth in
112. Id. at 251.
113. Id. The Court found that the Massachusetts Citizens for Life's (MCFL) "Special Edition"
publication fell within the Congressional intent of § 441b for three reasons. Id. at 243. The first was
based on the legislative history and purpose of the provision. Id. at 246-47. The second was based on
its examination of the language of the statute. Id. at 248-50. The third reason involved the way the
edition was put together. Id. at 250-51. This separated it from a "regular newsletter," which would be
exempt. Id. at 245-50.
114. Id. at 256.
115. Id. at 263 (stating the wish for a "bright-line" rule was not enough). The Court explained
that MCFL was not a "profit-making enterprise" trying to seek an unfair advantage in the "political
arena," but rather, a political organization that just happened to be incorporated. Id. at 258-59. In
other words, the Court stated § 441b would not be constitutional if applied to a corporation that: (1)
was begun to promote a political ideology; (2) "has no shareholders or other persons [with claims to]
assets or earnings"; and (3) "was not established by a business corporation or a labor union." Id. at
263-64.
116. Id.
117. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
118. Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 628.
119. Id. at 608. The provision prohibited both "persons" and any "multi[-]candidate political
committee" from directly or indirectly making contributions of various limits. Id. at 610; see also 2
U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)-(3) (1994).
120. Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 612.
121. Id. (stating that the FEC agreed with the Democratic Party "that the purchase of radio time
was an 'expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for Federal
office' [that] exceeded the Party expenditure ... limits" (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3) (1994))).
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favor of the regulation, to prevent corruption or the appearance of it, was
not constitutionally sufficient. 122 It was an insufficient interest because
there was no "coordination between the candidate and the source of the
expenditure."1 23 It stated that the interest would be similarly insufficient
if Congress' intent was to prevent what it thought was uneconomical and
unnecessary campaign spending. 124
The Court then distinguished what it saw as an independent expen-
diture from a coordinated one. 125 The Court stated the FEC's determi-
nation of whether an expenditure was independent or coordinated would
not be a definitive label for "constitutional purposes." 126 It found no
evidence of knowledge of the expenditure by the candidate and there-
fore found that it was indeed an independent expenditure. 127 The Court
therefore held that the First Amendment prohibited the expenditure
restraint.128
In the one concurrence and the two dissents there were continued
criticisms of Buckley. 129 Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, criticized
both Buckley's and the majority's different treatment of contributions
and expenditures, finding that whether a party was spending money in
"cooperation, consultation, or concert with" a candidate or not did not
matter because the effect was the same-a restriction of speech.130 He
argued that a "[p]arty spending 'in cooperation, consultation, or concert
with' a candidate . . is indistinguishable in substance from expenditures
by the candidate or his campaign committee."1 31
Justice Thomas found that the contribution versus expenditure
distinction developed in Buckley should be overruled.132 He stated that
there was only one difference between a contribution and an expendi-
ture: a contribution will pass through an intermediary whereas an expen-
122. Id. at 617.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 618.
125. Id. at 621. The Court found that there was an important distinction between the two types of
expenditures with the basic difference being whether the person doing the spending had informed the
candidate or not. Id.
126. Id. at 622 (stating that "the government 'cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional
rights by mere labels' (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963))).
127. Id. at 623-24. Because the lower court did not examine the case in light of it being an
independent expenditure, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 625.
128. Id. The Court stated "[Tihe First Amendment prohibits the application of this provision to
the kind of expenditure at issue here-an expenditure that the political party has made independently,
without coordination with any canditate." Id. at 608.
129. Id. at 627-50.
130. Id. at 629-30 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1, 21 (1976)) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
131. Id. at 630.
132. Id. at 636 (citing Chief Justice Burger's proposition in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1, 241
(1976) that "contributions and expenditures are two sides of the same First Amendment coin")
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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diture might not.13 3 To give an example, Justice Thomas stated "[a]
campaign poster that reads simply 'We support candidate Smith' does
not seem to me any less deserving of constitutional protection than one
that reads 'We support candidate Smith because we like his position on
agriculture subsidies."1 34  He asserted that when an individual gives
money to an organization, that individual strengthens that organization's
ability to communicate a message.135 This, Justice Thomas argued,
allowed for "free discussion of governmental affairs."136 He argued
that this single distinction "lacks constitutional significance."1 37
Justice Stevens dissented and stated that there were three reasons,
similar to those given throughout the Buckley decision, why all money
should be treated like contributions. 138 The first was that there was a
"special interdependency" between candidates and parties that opened
itself up to the possible danger of improper influence.139 The second
reason was that the restrictions in the FECA supplement each other, that
is, the parts, when put together, serve a larger purpose. 140 The third
reason, first discussed by Justice White,141 was that money is not always
the same as speech.142 Justice Stevens also asserted that Congress has
more "wisdom and experience" to deal with the campaign finance
issue. 14 3
4. Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee
On June 25, 2001, the United States Supreme Court handed down
Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Cam-
paign Committee (Colorado 11).144 Colorado I dealt with whether
FECA's spending restrictions "were unconstitutional as applied to
Colorado's Republican Party's independent expenditures in connection
with a senatorial campaign."1 45 Colorado II was a facial challenge to
133. Id. at 638 (stating also that "[a] contribution is simply an indirect expenditure; though
contributions and expenditures may thus differ in form, they do not differ in substance").
134. Id. at 639-40.
135. Id. at 636.
136. Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
137. Id.
138. Id at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 648-49.
140. Id. at 649.
141. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 263 (1976) (noting that "money is not always equivalent
to or used for speech") (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
142. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Commn'n (Colorado 1), 518 U.S.
604, 649 (1996).
143. Id. at 650.
144. 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001).
145. Colorado 11, 121 S. Ct. at 2356; see also supra Part II.B.3.
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the limits on parties' "coordinated expenditures."1 46 The issue in
Colorado II was "whether the First Amendment allows coordinated elec-
tion expenditures by parties to be treated functionally as contributions,
the way coordinated expenditures by other entities are treated." 147 The
party argued that because its speech was political its spending, whether
coordinated or not, should be free from the FECA's restrictions.14 8 The
party believed that its character, that of being a party, should create a
stricter scrutiny of any efforts to regulate it, thus treating it differently
from individuals or PACs.149 However, the Government argued that:
[i]f coordinated spending were unlimited, circumvention would
increase: because coordinated spending is as effective as direct
contributions in supporting a candidate, an increased
opportunity for coordinated spending would aggravate the use
of a party to funnel money to a candidate from individuals and
nonparty groups, who would thus bypass the contribution
limits that Buckley upheld.150
The Court found that the party was not in an unique position. 15 1
The Court found that the party should be treated the same as individuals
and PACs and that the appropriate scrutiny was whether the restriction
was closely drawn to a sufficiently important government interest.152
The Court found that the government's purpose in preventing abuses
from unlimited coordinated spending was sufficient. 153 The Court also
found that the restriction was closely drawn. 154 The Court rejected the
arguments that there are better safeguards, such as the earmarking
rule,155 and the arguments that limitations on contributions to parties
would be less restrictive than limits on coordinated expenditures.156 In
distinguishing Colorado I, the Court stated "the choice here [Colorado
II] is not, as in Buckley and Colorado I, between a limit on pure contri-
butions and pure expenditures. The choice is between limiting contribu-
tions and limiting expenditures whose special value as expenditures is
146. Colorado 1, 121 S. Ct. at2356.
147. Id. at 2360.
148. Id. at 2360-61.
149. Id. at 2361.
150. Id. at 2361-62.
151. Id. at 2366.
152. Id. (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000)).
153. 1d at2367.
154. Id. at 2369-71.
155. Id. at 2369-70. "[T]he earmarking rule of § 441a(a)(8) ... provides that contributions that
.are in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit to [a] candidate'
are treated as contributions to the candidate." Id. at 2369.
156. Id. at 2370-71.
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also the source of their power to corrupt." 157 The Court rejected the
party's facial challenge and reversed the Tenth Circuit.158
5. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union 15 9 is important
in understanding the Nixon decision160 because the Court thoroughly
examined and analyzed the interest of curtailing corruption or the
appearance of it.161 In National Treasury, the Court dealt with whether
the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, particularly § 501(b), violated the First
Amendment by making it illegal for government employees to accept
money in exchange for articles or speeches, even when the articles or
speeches were not connected to their job.162
The Court stated that the standard was that "[t]he Government must
show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of
present and future employees in a broad range of present and future
expression are outweighed by that expression's 'necessary impact on the
actual operation."" 163 After acknowledging that the regulation was view-
point neutral and that it inflicted a considerable burden on expression,
the Court then applied this test to § 501(b).164 It stated that since the
preponderance of speech at issue did not involve government work-
related topics and also occurred outside the place of work, § 501(b)
failed the test. 165 Even though administrative efficiency was an impor-
tant governmental interest, it was not sufficient.166 The Court stated:
When the Government defends a regulation on speech as a
means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it
must do more than simply "posit the existence of the disease
sought to be cured." . . . It must demonstrate that the recited
157. Id. at 2371.
158. Id.
159. 513 U.S. 454 (1995). It should be noted that this case was not directly related to the FECA.
See Nat'l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 458-59 (1995) (stating that the provision being challenged was found in
the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 which states that "[a]n individual may not receive any honorarium
while that individual is a [m]ember, officer or employee").
160. See generally Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
161. See Nat'l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 457-59.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 468 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968)).
164. Id. at 468.
165. Id. at 470.
166. Id. at 473-74.
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harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation
will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.167
The court concluded that the possible yield from the ban was insufficient
and that § 501(b) was also "crudely crafted." 168
6. Conclusion of Case Law Since Buckley
The current test for analyzing campaign finance regulation is that
"[e]ven a 'significant interference with protected rights of political asso-
ciation' may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently
important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unneces-
sary abridgement of associational freedoms." 169 Even though both
contribution and expenditure limitations affect First Amendment
interests, expenditure restrictions are treated more severely.170 The
interest in preventing corruption, whether real or perceived, is considered
by the Court to be a "sufficiently important interest" for restricting
contributions but not for restricting expenditures. 171 However, National
Treasury established that recited harms must be real and not "merely
conjectural."1 72
III. ANALYSIS
In Nixon, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the
following two issues: (1) whether Buckley was applicable to state contri-
bution limits to state political candidates and (2) whether the monetary
limits set forth in Buckley are still applicable today.173 In a plurality
opinion written by Justice Souter and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Conner, the Court found: (1) that the Buckley test did
apply to state contribution limits but (2) that the amount was not limited
167. Id. at 475 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)). The Court also
looked to previous statements from Justice Brandeis such as:
[a] "reasonable" burden on expression requires a justification far stronger than mere
speculation about serious harms. "Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression
of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. . . . To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will
result if free speech is practiced."
Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)).
168. Id. at 477.
169. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488
(1975)).
170. Id. at 23.
171. Id. at 26.
172. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995).
173. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 381-82 (2000).
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by Buckley, and therefore the Court upheld Missouri's contribution
limits.174
Justice Stevens concurred only as to the judgment.175 Justice
Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment.176
Justice Kennedy dissented.1 77 Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia also
dissented. 178
A. PLURALITY OPINION
The Court first examined the issue of whether Missouri's statutory
contribution limitations that applied to political action committees
should be analyzed under the Buckley standard. 179 It found that Buckley
applied.18 0 The Court explained that contribution restrictions infringed
on First Amendment freedoms of speech and association as well as Equal
Protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment' 8' Since the First
and Fourteenth Amendments were implicated, federal constitutional law
applied; therefore, Buckley was ruling precedent.182
The standard that the Court created in Buckley was was neither that
of O'Brien nor the "time, place, and manner" type.' 8 3 The Court
asserted once again that there was a difference between how contribu-
tions were treated versus expenditures. 184 It stated that while this
distinction may not have been made clear in Buckley, it had explicitly
recognized this distinction in subsequent case law.185 Therefore, contri-
bution limits would be sustained if the "[g]overnment demonstrated that
174. Id. at 397-98.
175. Id. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring). He found that the First Amendment was not applicable
to this case because money is not speech and the rights in question were only property interests. Id.
176. Id. at 399 (Breyer, J., concurring). He would have found: (1) that the Court should balance
the constitutional interest of the First Amendment speech and the constitutional interest of equalizing
citizens' voices instead of trying to apply a rigid test (that is, strict scrutiny), and (2) that the Court may
need to reexamine the distinctions between contribution restrictions and expenditure restrictions. Id. at
400-04.
177. Id. at 405 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He found: (1) that the reason for treating contributions
and expenditures differently was flawed, and he would strike both down, (2) that Buckley should be
overruled, and (3) that the Court should have applied more "serious scrutiny" because of the
seriousness of the First Amendment infringement at stake. Id. at 405-10.
178. Id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He would: (1) use strict scrutiny, (2) find that Missouri
failed both parts of this test because it did not have a sufficient interest and there were less restrictive
alternatives, (3) find that the rational supporting the contribution/expenditure distinction was not
reasonable, and (4) ultimately, overrule Buckley. Id. at 410-30.
179. Id. at 381-82.
180. Id. at 397 (stating that there was "no reason in logic or evidence to doubt the sufficiency of
Buckley to govern").
181. Id. at 385.
182. Id. at 387-88.
183. Id. at 386.
184. Id. at 386-87.
185. Id. at 387. See generally Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
518 U.S. 604 (1996).
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contribution regulation was 'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently
important interest."' 186 After clarifying the test for contribution restric-
tions, the Court then applied the test to examine the constitutionality of
Missouri's statute. 187
The Court first looked to the interest Missouri gave for establishing
the statute. 188 It stated that Missouri's interest was similar to Congress'
in Buckley.189 That interest was to prevent corruption and the appear-
ance of it from campaign contributions. 190 This was found to be a
sufficient interest that the Court stated posed "no serious question." 191
The Court analyzed what the proof requirement was to pass this interest
portion of the test. 192 It stated that the amount of evidence necessary to
justify the interest would "vary up or down" depending on the "plausi-
bility of the justification raised."193
It then reconciled the problem that National Treasury194 present-
ed. 195 National Treasury held that when the government restricts speech,
the harms that it proposes to treat must be "real, not merely conjec-
tural." 196 The problem in Nixon was that one of the interests proposed
by Missouri was the "appearance of corruption." 197 The Court faced
the problem of "mere conjecture" versus "the appearance of
corruption."198
The Court asserted that there might be a need for evidence of actual
corruption if Fredman and Shrink could cast doubt on the validity of the
evidence admitted. 199 Fredman and Shrink, however, could only point to
studies that demonstrated contributions did not lead directly to changes
in the candidate's voting. 200 The Court found that there were other
186. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
25 (1976)).
187. Id. at 390-97.
188. Id. at 390.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. ("Democracy works 'only if the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is
bound to be shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities which arouse
suspicions of malfeasance and corruption."' (quoting United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co.,
364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961))).
192. Id. at 391.
193. Id. For example, the Court stated that Buckley was scrutinized in the context of the
disturbing problems with the 1972 election. Id.
194. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995).
195. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000).
196. Nat'l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 475 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664
(1994)).
197. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 392.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 394.
200. See id. (stating that this was insufficient and finding that other studies pointed the opposite
way).
2001] 327
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:309
studies that contradicted this.201 It stated that in evaluating the clash of
information, there was only modest evidence to doubt that contributions
were actually corrupting our political system and very little evidence to
question suspicion of corruption among voters. 202 The Court examined
an assortment of Missouri's evidence and evidence cited by the district
court's findings. 203 This included: Proposition A,204 an affidavit from a
state senator, 205 and various newspaper accounts and reports. 206 The
Court found that this evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that the
same congressional concerns that existed in Buckley were present in the
passage of Missouri's law. 207
The Court then examined the second issue of whether Buckley
specified a permissible amount that contributions could be limited.208 It
stated that Missouri would have to have a sufficiently tailored statute to
serve a legitimate interest in order for the statute to be constitutional. 209
It paralleled this case to that of Buckley, finding that there was no proof
that the contribution limitations in Missouri's law would have a negative
effect on the funding of a campaign or a political association.2 10 The
Court repeated the district court finding that since the statute at issue had
become law, candidates for office were still able to receive enough
201. Id.
202. Id. at 394-95.
203. Id. at 393-95.
204. Id. at 393-94 (quoting Carver v. Nixon, 882 F. Supp. 901, 905 (W.D. Mo. 1995), rev'd, 72
F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), "[Tihe statewide vote on Proposition A certainly attested to the perception
relied upon here: 'an overwhelming 74 percent of the voters of Missouri determined that contribution
limits are necessary to combat corruption and the appearance thereof.'). But the Court also made
clear that majority votes (referring to the proposition) do not defeat First Amendment protections. Id.
at 394.
205. See id. at 393 (stating that the Court examined an affidavit from State Senator Wayne
Goode, who was the co-chair for the Joint Committee for Campaign Finance Reform, which stated,
"large contributions have 'the real potential to buy votes"').
206. Id. The Court looked to the district court findings of newspaper accounts that showed that
big contributions supported inferences of improprieties. Id. One report noted that the state's treasurer
made a decision to use a specific bank for most of Missouri's banking practices after that bank gave
$20,000 to the treasurer's campaign. Id.
207. Id. at 395-96. The Court noted that the Eighth Circuit itself, while invalidating limits on
Proposition A, identified clear improprieties between campaign contributions and Missouri officials.
See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 642 (8th Cir. 1995). Also in Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528
U.S. 377, 393-94 (2000), the Court stated
the Eighth Circuit . . . identified a $420,000 contribution to candidates in northern
Missouri from a political action committee linked to an investment bank, and three
scandals, including one in which a state representative "was accused of sponsoring
legislation in exchange for kickbacks," and another in which Missouri's former attorney
general pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to misuse of state property.
Id. (quoting Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633,642 n.10 (8th Cir. 1995)).
208. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 395.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 395-96.
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money to run effective campaigns. 2 11 The Court noted that even before
the statute took effect, 97.62% of all contributors to the state auditor's
campaign gave $2,000 or less. 2 12
The Court clarified that Buckley never set a constitutionally permis-
sible minimum contribution amount that could be restricted.2 13 Rather,
the Court explained, the test was, "whether the contribution limitation
was so radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive
the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and render
contributions pointless." 2 14 Therefore Missouri's statute was entirely
constitutional.El 5 The Court stated that there was no qualm about
Buckley's appropriateness to govern this case.2 16
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but argued that this case
should not fall under First Amendment analysis because "[m]oney is
property; it is not speech." 2 17 He would decide this case by using a
property-based analysis. 2 18 Explaining his reasoning, Justice Stevens
asserted, "[s]peech has the power to inspire volunteers to perform a
multitude of tasks on a campaign trail .... Money ... has the power to
pay . . . laborers to perform the same tasks." 2 19 He stated that it was
wrong to assume that the First Amendment protected the use of money
to accomplish goals in the same way it protected the use of ideas to
complete those results. 220
Justice Stevens stated that while the Constitution protected this
property interest, a governmental regulation such as the one at issue
should be viewed as a deprivation of liberty or property.2 2 1 He argued
that to rely on the First Amendment to invalidate campaign finance
211. Id. at 396; see also Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 741 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(stating that candidates would still be able to put together impressive amounts of money for their
campaigns).
212. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 396 (explaining that Fredman only identified one contributor that
would have given him more than the $1,075 capped by the statute).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 397 (stating that the cases after Buckley should not be viewed as a "narrow question
about the power of the dollar").
215. Id. at 397-98. This was constitutional even though the $1,000 contribution in Buckley was
worth far more in value today than the $1,075 limit sought by Missouri because of inflation. Id. at 396.
In other words, the actual limited contribution amount is much more severe than the one allowed in
Buckley. Id. at 396-97.
216. Id. at 397-98.
217. Id. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring).
218. Id. at 399.
219. Id. at 398.
220. Id.
221. Id at 398-99 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513 (1977)).
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regulations, such as in the case at hand, was inaccurate. 222 Justice Stevens
asserted that this case, like that of Moore v. East Cleveland,2 23 involved
property rights that were "not entitled to the same protection as the right
to say what one pleases." 2 24 Justice Stevens saw Moore as a case analo-
gous to the one at hand as an application of a misguided analysis. 2 2 5
C. JUSTIcE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote separately to
address the question of what the appropriate standard of test should
be. 226 He agreed that the majority was correct in the outcome. 227 He
argued that this case was one "where constitutionally protected interests
lie on both sides of the legal equation." 228 Justice Breyer asserted that
just because the words "strict scrutiny" are brought up in the applica-
tion of a test that does not mean the law at issue is presumptively
unconstitutional. 229 He agreed with Justice Stevens that money was not
speech, 230 but he disagreed on the applicable test because "money
enables speech." 231 Because he found that money enabled speech, the
First Amendment was of direct concern. 232 Justice Breyer asserted that
the "Constitution 'demands' that each citizen have 'an equally effective
voice."' 233 Contribution restrictions allow for a more just process
because they equalize the voice of an individual so that money does not
play the decisive factor.234 He recognized that Buckley used language
222. See id. at 399 (stating that it would be, "the functional equivalent of the Court's candid
reliance on the doctrine of substantive due process as articulated in the two prevailing opinions in
Moore v. East Cleveland').
223. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
224. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399 (2000).
225. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 496-97. Inez Moore was convicted of violating a housing ordinance
that limited occupancy of her unit to family. Id. The ordinance recognized only certain related
individuals as family. Id. The Court held that the ordinance violated the substantive due process
doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment because it made it a crime for Moore to live with her son and
grandsons. Id. at 506. Justice Stevens asserted that "[tielling a grandmother that she may not use her
property to provide shelter to a grandchild-or to hire mercenaries to work in that grandchild's
campaign for public office," brings up vital constitutional concerns that are unconnected to the First
Amendment. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 399.
226. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 399-400 (Breyer, J., concurring).
227. Id. at 400.
228. Id.
229. See id. (finding that it was not possible that "mechanical application of the tests associated
with 'strict scrutiny'--the tests of 'compelling interests' and 'least restrictive means'-will properly
resolve the difficult constitutional problem that campaign finance statutes pose").
230. Id.
231. See id. (stating that it helped with communicating a political point and drawing votes of
equally minded voters, therefore affecting both freedoms of speech and association).
232. Id. at 401.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 401-02.
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that could have been interpreted to mean that there was a presumption to
find certain contribution laws unconstitutional. 235
Justice Breyer argued that, in reality, when the Court has dealt with
contribution and expenditure restrictions, it has not used a simple test but
rather "balanced" First Amendment interests against the need for a free,
democratic process. 236 He asserted "[t]he Constitution[ 237] often per-
mits restrictions on the speech of some in order to prevent a few from
drowning out the many." 238 In practice, this means finding whether a
statute disproportionately burdens one interest over the other.239
Justice Breyer would find that this was exactly the sort of balancing
that has been done with various other "competing constitutional
interests" such as privacy, 240  First Amendment interests of listeners or
viewers, 241 and First Amendment interests involved in the broadcast
media.242 He asserted that the reason the Missouri statute was valid was
because it treated these Constitutional interests equally. 243
Justice Breyer stated that while he did not believe the Missouri
statutory limit was too l0w,244 he acknowledged that the monetary limit
did raise this question. 245 He asserted that when dealing with campaign
finance reform, the Court would be better suited to leave the issue to the
political judgment of the legislature because it was more knowledgeable
about the problem. 246 He agreed with Justice Kennedy's suggestion, 247
that if the Court would not allow Congress to come up with its own
235. Id. Justice Breyer reiterated that Buckley explicitly rejected the proposition that it was
acceptable to limit the speech of some to enlarge the voice of others. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 48-49 (1976).
236. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402-03 (2000).
237. See id. at 402 (stating that the Constitution restricts speech, as in Article 1, § 6 which limits
the amount of time members of Congress can debate so that everyone has "an equal opportunity to
express his or her views"). The concurrence also provided the example of limited ballot access. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 402.
240. See id. at 403 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485-88 (1988), "balancing [the] rights
of privacy and expression").
241. See id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 192-94, (1997), "recognizing the
speech interests of both viewers and cable operators").
242. See id. (citing CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102-03 (1973), finding that this
"is a task of great delicacy and difficulty").
243. Id. at 403-04. Justice Breyer also asserted that this way of balancing interests was similar to
how other countries deal with the problem. Id at 403 (citing to Bowman v. United Kingdom (1998) 26
Eur. H. R. Rep. 1; Libman v. Quebec (A.G.) (1997), 151 D.L.R. (4th) 385.(S.C.C.)). Both Bowman and
Libman demanded proportionality in the campaign finance context. Id.
244. Mo. REV. STAT. § 130.032(1) & (2) (2001) (showing that the statutory limit was $1,075 or
$378 if figured in 1976 dollars).
245. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 404 (2000) (stating that any contribution
limit law would narrow the field of challengers to "some degree").
246. Id. at 403-04.
247. Id. at 404-05.
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solutions to campaign finance, it might be time to take another look at
Buckley.248
D. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S DISSENT
Justice Kennedy dissented and would rely on the traditional First
Amendment analysis of strict scrutiny. 249 He found the Court's ap-
proach "unacceptable for a case announcing a rule that suppresses one
of our most essential and prevalent forms of political speech." 250 He
argued that it was time to face the problems associated with the Buckley
decision. 251 He would have relied on the traditional First Amendment
standards. 252
Justice Kennedy argued that the analysis begun in Buckley "set the
stage for a new kind of speech [covert speech] to enter the political
system." 25 3 He specifically described the Court's creation of "covert
speech" as having "forced a substantial amount of political speech
underground, as contributors and candidates devise ever more elaborate
methods of avoiding contribution limits, limits which take no account of
rising campaign costs." 2 54  The term "covert speech" is used to de-
scribe the creative efforts put into concealing the real purpose of
speech. 255 The main type of covert speech is "soft money," 256 which is
248. Id. Justice Kennedy found that it might be time to extinguish the distinction between how
contributions and expenditures are treated. Id. at 409 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He agreed with
Justice Thomas' assertion that the reasoning in different treatment is based on a "faulty distinction."
See id. at 413 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 408 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 405.
251. Id. at 406. Justice Kennedy stated:
The justifications for the case system and stare decisis must rest upon the Court's
capacity, and responsibility, to acknowledge its missteps ...to face up to adverse,
unintended consequences flowing from our own prior decisions .... I submit the Court
does not accept this .... [lI]t perpetuates and compounds a serious distortion of the First
Amendment resulting from our own intervention in Buckley.
Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See Jenny Murphy, Should Soft Money Be Banned? SpeakOut.com Staff Writer, at
http://www.speakout.comIssues/Briefs/1096/ (Feb. 3, 2000). Soft money is:
Funds donated by corporations, unions and individuals to political parties .... This
money is intended to be used for general party building activities such as voter
registration drives. Since soft money is not used to support individual candidates, it is not
regulated under federal campaign laws, and there are no limits placed on the amounts
that can be contributed.
However, soft money has been used to pay for political ads that indirectly support
particular candidates by endorsing their views. Since these ads often feature a
candidate's name and image, the true intent of ads has been questioned.
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money used in unlimited amounts, 257 often to "fund so-called issue
advocacy advertisements." 258
Justice Kennedy argued that the Court made a mistake in Buckley
by holding that expenditures would not survive strict scrutiny while
contribution limitations would.259 He asserted that this would create an
inadequate system, which would blur what speech is.260 Justice Kennedy
pointed out that in the current system "[s]oft money must be raised to
attack the problem of soft money" because you will still, in practical
terms, need money which will be given via soft money to get elected in
order to fight the problem.261
He explained that Mr. Fredman was an "outsider," not an incum-
bent and that the Court's Nixon decision told Mr. Fredman that he may
not challenge the current system unless he gave into it first.262 This was
because the incumbent would still be allowed to receive soft money. 263
The current system also "create[d] dangers" by requiring contributors
of soft money and those that receive it to conceal their real purpose, and
also by having an "indirect system of accountability that is confusing, if
not dispiriting, to the voter." 264 He found that these dangers were of
greater concern than the ones they replaced.265
Justice Kennedy would find that the law would not pass "any seri-
ous standard of First Amendment review" because apparent corruption
would not survive strict scrutiny. 266 Justice Kennedy concluded by
stating that he would first overrule Buckley and then allow Congress, by
interpreting the First Amendment itself, to attempt to handle the problem
of campaign financing. 267
E. JUSTICE THOMAS' DISSENT
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented by first arguing
that the plurality employed a sui generis test, 2 68 to balance away First
257. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 406 (2000) (citing Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996), stating that soft money is
unrestricted as to the amount a contributor may give).
258. Id. (stating that "issue advocacy" is advancing or assaulting a candidate's position on an
issue without specifically asking that they be defeated or elected).
259. Id. at 407.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 408.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 409-10.
268. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (7th ed. 1999) (defining sui generis as "[o]f its own kind or
class; unique or peculiar"). Justice Thomas asserted that this test was peculiar as compared to other
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Amendment freedoms. 269 He asserted that the Court erred with every
step of its analysis because it applied the Buckley test. 270 He argued that
the. appropriate test was strict scrutiny. 271 Strict scrutiny was needed
because "[p]olitical speech is the primary object of First Amendment
protection." 272 He asserted that Missouri would fail both the compelling
interest portion as well as the narrowly tailored requirement. 273
He argued that the "Founders" 274 wanted to protect individual
political speech especially during campaigns for office. 275 He found
that the Court in this decision abandoned these principles.2 76 Justice
Thomas asserted that the plurality, by applying less than strict scrutiny,
purposefully harmed political speech instead of protecting it.277
Justice Thomas then asserted that Buckley's test had been under-
mined over the years. 278 Justice Thomas disagreed with Buckley's 279
assertion that contributing to a candidate for office is dissimilar from
that candidate directly expending money.2 80 He argued that the Court,
in Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political
Action Committee,281 discarded "the argument that a contribution does
not represent the constitutionally protected speech of a contributor." 282
Justice Thomas saw no distinction between contributions and
expenditures because contributors give money when they think speech
by a group will be superior to their own speech. 283 Justice Thomas
argued that it was perfectly reasonable for "individuals to speak through
contributions rather than through independent expenditures."' 284 He
First Amendment constitutional tests. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 418 (2000)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
269. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 410.
270. Id. at 412.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 410-11 (making numerous remarks indicating why he believed this function was so
important).
273. Id. at 411-12.
274. ld. at 411. In reference to "Founders," Justice Thomas quoted James Madison who stated
"The value and efficacy of [the right to elect the members of government] depends on the knowledge
of the comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust, and on the equal freedom,
consequently, of examining and discussing these merits and demerits of the candidates respectively."
Id. (quoting Madison, Report on the Resolutions (1799), in 6 WRrrNGS OF JAMES MADISON 397 (G. Hunt
ed. 1906) (alteration in original)).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at412.
278. Id.
279. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (stating the premise that "[w]hile contributions
may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the
voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than
the contributor").
280. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 413 (2000).
281. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
282. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 414.
283. Id.
284. Id at 415. In Colo. Republican Fed Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S.
604, 636 (1996), individual citizens understandably realize that they "may add more to political
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stated that this was the reason that contributions should not be treated
differently from expenditures, and the "First Amendment mandates that
we presume that speakers, not the government, know best both what they
want to say and how to say it."285
Justice Thomas found that not only did Buckley degrade the speech
interests of contributors, but that it also did the same to the candidates. 286
The Court stated in Buckley 287 that contribution restrictions do restrict
speech by association of the candidates. 288 Justice Thomas asserted that
the First Amendment was intended to put restrictions on the government
and to allow the individual to choose how to speak. 289 Justice Thomas
argued that the Court, in applying the Buckley standard and upholding
Missouri's statute, had harmed Mr. Fredman, who was not an incumbent
and did not have a lot of money, because the Missouri law limited him
from spreading his message. 290 Justice Thomas argued that while the
Court professed to use a test of the "closest scrutiny" in Buckley, it
actually used "something less-much less-than strict scrutiny." 291
Justice Thomas asserted that the Court in Buckley stated that only
actual corruption or the appearance of it would suffice as a "compel-
ling" interest. 292 Under a strict scrutiny analysis, however, this would
fail the first part of the test because the interest was not a "compelling"
one, and therefore the Missouri law would be unconstitutional. 293
Not only did the Court fail in its analysis of Buckley, Justice Thomas
contended, but the Court also extended that holding. 294 The "exten-
sion," Justice Thomas found, was that in Buckley and opinions since,295
the word "corruption" was used in a narrow quid pro quo sense mean-
ing "perversion or destruction of integrity in the discharge of public
duties by bribery or favour."296 In National Conservative Political
Action Committee, Justice Thomas argued that the meaning of corruption
was extended, giving "it a new, far-reaching (and speech-suppressing)
discourse by giving rather than spending, if the donee is able to put the funds to more productive use
than can the individual."
285. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 418 (quoting Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781,
790-91 (1988)).
286. Id.
287. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1976).
288. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 418.
289. Id. (discussing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971)).
290. Id. at 420.
291. Id. at 421.
292. Id. at 422 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-26).
293. Id. at 426.
294. Id. at 424-25.
295. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
497-98 (1985) (finding that since the Buckley decision, the Court has interpreted "corruption," to have
a narrow meaning).
296. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 422 (2000) (citing 3 OXFORD ENGUISH
DICrIONARY 974 (2d ed. 1989)).
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definition." 297 Justice Thomas stated that the governmental interest ac-
cepted in Buckley298 was part of the problem. 299 He contended that the
plurality never stated what corruption stood for.300 The plurality "per-
mits vague and unenumerated harms to suffice as a compelling reason
for the government to smother political speech." 30 1  He asserted that
this was because "we are never told with assurance" exactly what corrup-
tion consists of in National Conservative Political Action Committee .302
Justice Thomas argued that the plurality also lessened the require-
ment of tailoring. 303 Justice Thomas contended that the Court allowed
much greater restrictive contribution limitations, varying from $250 to
$1,000.304 The difference between Buckley's and Missouri's caps, he
asserted, was more pronounced if one accounted for inflation. 30 5 The
Court failed to pay attention to the significantly lower amounts allowed
in this case. 306 He contended that the Court failed to explain why
political action committees should be treated like individuals. 307 He
argued that it also "fail[ed] to explain why caps that vary with the size of
political districts [were] tailored to corruption." 308
Justice Thomas questioned whether the plurality would find that a
$251 contribution could cause corruption. 309 He pointed to the plurali-
ty's own evidence that "97.62 percent of all contributors to candidates
for state auditor made contributions of $2,000 or less."310 He wrote:
If the [plurality's] assumption is incorrect-i.e., if Missouri's
contribution limits actually do significantly reduce campaign
297. Id. at 423.
298. Id. at 422-23 (stating that merely the appearance of corruption was sufficient).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 423.
301. Id. at 424.
302. Id. (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 497-98 (1985).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 425 (finding that these figures were priced in terms of 1995 dollars).
305. Id. (stating that if one used the Consumer Price Index, "a dollar today purchases about a
third of what it did in 1976").
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. (concluding also that, "contribution caps set at such levels could never be 'closely
drawn"'); see also BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
(2001) for a general discussion on certain myths associated with campaign finance reform. The author
notes that one
might also compare political spending to amounts spent by Americans on various other
products. For example, Americans spent two to three times as much money each year on
the purchase of potato chips. Proctor and Gamble and Phillip Morris Company, the
nation's two largest advertisers, spend roughly the same amount on advertising as is spent
by all political candidates and parties.
Id. at 42.
310. Nixonv. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,426 (2000).
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speech-then the [plurality's] calm assurance that political
speech remains unaffected collapses. If the [plurality's] as-
sumption is correct-i.e., if large contributions provide very
little assistance to a candidate seeking to get out his message
(and thus will not be missed when capped)-then the [plurali-
ty's] reasoning still falters. For if large contributions offer as
little help to a candidate as the Court maintains, then the Court
fails to explain why a candidate would engage in "corruption"
for such a meager benefit. The [plurality's] statistical claim
directly undercuts its constitutional defense that large
contributions pose a substantial risk of corruption. 311
Justice Thomas asserted that the second part of a strict scrutiny
analysis required that contribution limits be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.3 12 He argued that Missouri's statu-
tory contribution limits were not narrowly tailored to the harm.3 13 He
found that bribery and disclosure laws were more appropriate and less
restrictive methods to deal with the harm. 314 Justice Thomas contended
that since the law was not sufficiently tailored, the First Amendment
would not allow it.315 He stated that, in general, "[s]tates are free to
enact laws that directly punish those engaged in corruption and require
the disclosure of large contributions, but they are not free to enact
generalized laws that suppress a tremendous amount of protected speech
along with the targeted corruption." 3 16
To summarize, Justice Thomas found that strict scrutiny should be
applied rather than the standard from Buckley and that Buckley should
be overruled.3 17 He also found that the Missouri statute would fail both
parts of this test. 318 He found that the prevention of corruption, as
defined by the majority, was not a compelling interest and that the statute
was not tailored narrowly enough to pass strict scrutiny. 319 He asserted
that this was because there are less restrictive means to prevent corrup-
tion, specifically bribery and disclosure laws.32 0
311. ld.
312. Id. at 427.
313. See id. at 428 (stating that they were "crudely tailored" and "massively overinclusive").
314. Id. at 428-29.
315. Id. at 430.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 426,428.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 428-29.
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F. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S HOLDING IN NIXON
In conclusion, the Supreme Court in Nixon held that the test esta-
blished in Buckley was not that of traditional strict scrutiny as applied by
the Eighth Circuit.321 Rather, the contribution regulation would survive
if it were "'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently important interest,'
though the dollar amount of the limit need not be 'fine tuned."' 322 The
Court found that Missouri had shown through sufficient evidence that
such an interest, "deterring corruption or the appearance of it,"
existed. 323 Missouri's statutory contribution limitations were sufficiently
tailored because there was no specified constitutional minimum amount
which any state legislature could not go under. 324 Rather, the second
part of this test was whether the contribution limitation would "render
political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice
below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless." 325
IV. IMPACT
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld Missouri's statute
that limited the amount an individual or political action committee could
make as a contribution. 326 In doing so, the Supreme Court upheld the
Buckley precedent. 327 But the Court in its entirety was split, not only on
the holding, but also on the analysis. 328 For the first time since Buckley,
three Justices have acknowledged that they might be willing to recon-
sider the distinction between the treatment of contributions and expendi-
tures, 329 while three Justices have indicated their desire to completely
overrule it.330
This is a significant event because both proponents and opponents
of the Buckley decision believe that the reasoning behind the different
321. Id. at 387-88.
322. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976)).
323. Id. at 384.
324. Id. at 397.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 395-97.
327. Id. at 397.
328. Id. at 380.
329. Id. at 404-05. Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer stated, "it might prove possible to reinter-
pret aspects of Buckley ... stressed by Justice Kennedy ... making less absolute the contribution/
expenditure line." Id. at 405. Since Justice Stevens would include contributions as a property interest,
it is possible that he is also a proponent of ridding the system of the contributionexpenditure line. See
Marcia Coyle, High Court Campaign Finance Ruling Clears a Path: Pending Challenges to State
Limits May Help Refine 1976 'Buckley' Decision, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 7,2000, at A7.
330. See id. at 409-10. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating Justice Kennedy's belief that Buckley
should be overruled so that legislatures can enact their own campaign finance reforms based on their
First Amendment interpretations); see also id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.)
(asserting that Buckley should be overruled).
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treatment of the two is both flawed and the largest problem with
Buckley. 331 This decision also is significant because it suggests Congress
should try to resolve the issue.332 Congress has taken some steps to try
and solve what the majority of the Court perceives to be a problem.333
The decision is not, however, significant in terms of direct impact on
North Dakota law. 334 North Dakota allows for unlimited contributions
from both individuals and political committees to candidates. 335 North
Dakota also does not limit the amount a candidate can use toward
expenditures. 336 While North Dakota has no limitations on individual
contributions, 337 thirty-six states, including neighboring states, do.338
331. See Jeffrey Rosen, Talk is Cheap, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 14, 2000, at 20. Rosen wrote:
Supporters and opponents of campaign finance reform agree on little except this:
the compromise that the Supreme Court imposed on the nation 24 years ago in Buckley v.
Valeo has collapsed .... The theory was that giving money to a candidate is not really a
form of expression, while spending money to win an election is .... The Court . . .
suggested that expenditures are less corrupting than contributions, because candidates
can't corrupt themselves.
This logic didn't make a lot of sense in 1976, and it makes even less today.
Id.
332. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 409 (2000) (stating that Buckley should
be overruled and then the Court should "free Congress or state legislatures to attempt some new
reform").
333. See Campaign Finance Revision, Hearings on S. 26/S. 1593 Before the Senate Rules Commit-
tee on Campaign Finance Reform, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement on April 5, 2000 of Christopher
Shays, representative and Co-sponsor of the Shays-Meehan Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act,
H.R. 417). Some of these steps include: H.R. 417, the Shays-Meehan Bipartisan Campaign Finance
Reform Act, which purports to ban soft money, closes the issue of ad loophole, gives the FEC the
power it needs to enforce the legislation, and creates a bipartisan commission to recommend further
improvements. Id. Another step is S. 26/S. 1593, the companion bill in the Senate, entitled the
McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act which purports to completely eliminate
political party soft money, including money funneled through state parties for use in
federal elections; increases the aggregate hard dollar contribution limit from $25,000 to
$30,000; and codifies the Beck decision to require labor organizations to annually notify
employees who pay agency fees of their eligibility to object to the use of their funds for
political activities.
Id.
334. See EDWARD D. FEIGENBAUM & JAMEs A. PALMER, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW 2000, at ND-I to ND-7 (2000) (illustrating that North Dakota has neither contribution
limits nor expenditure restrictions).
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3 (1997 & Supp. 1999) (requiring contribution restric-
tions for corporations, cooperative corporations, limited liability companies, and associations, but not
for political committees).
338. See generally FEIGENBAUM & PALMER, supra note 334 (illustrating that, along with the District
of Colombia, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri (current case), Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming all have limitations for individual contributions). North
Dakota, Alabama, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Virginia do not have restrictions on contribution limits by individuals
(not including judicial campaigns). Id. at Chart 2-A & 2-B.
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The Nixon decision is significant because, while the Court upheld
Missouri's state contribution limits, it did not define what would be the
lowest amount of contribution restriction permissible under the Con-
stitution. 339 Still at issue, or at least unclear, is what will suffice for
evidence to justify a state's interest in preventing corruption or the
appearance of it. 340 Along those lines, is the issue of what the Court in
the future will interpret "corruption" to mean. 34 1
Since Nixon, lower courts in the federal judiciary have examined
some of the same issues. 342 For instance, the Eighth Circuit recently held
that sections 130.032.4 and 130.032.7 of the Missouri Revised Statutes
were unconstitutional. 343 These sections limited the amount of money
and in-kind contributions that parties could give to a candidate. 344 The
court found that they were unconstitutional because they restricted
expenditures by political parties. 345
In Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics & Election Prac-
tices, 346 the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld both contribution
limits to congressional members in Maine and a matching fund system
corresponding to expenditures made by candidates. 347 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals began analyzing the contribution limitation, in accor-
dance with Nixon's holding, by examining whether there were sufficient
evidentiary justifications to support Maine's contention of the threat of
corruption or the appearance of it. 348 The court found that state repre-
sentative testimony, along with a significant amount of press clippings,
surveys, and a referendum were sufficient to meet the evidentiary
obligation set forth in Nixon.349 The court then looked to whether
the Maine Act was overbroad by limiting contributions to $250 and
$500.350 It found that Maine's limits, though smaller than those held
339. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000) (stating that the test is,
"whether the contribution limitation was so radical in effect as to render political association
ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and render contributions
pointless," and the Court did not propose an exact amount).
340. See supra notes 294-316 and accompanying text.
341. Id.
342. See infra notes 343-70 and accompanying text.
343. Mo. Republican Party v. Lamb, 227 F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (8th Cir. 2000). But see North
Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 108 F.Supp.2d 498, 518 (E.D. N.C. 2000). In Leake, the District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina held that North Carolina's limits on contributions to
political committees were sufficiently tailored and therefore constitutional. Id.
344. Mo. Republican Party, 227 F.3d at 1073-74.
345. Id.
346. 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000).
347. Daggett, 205 F.3d at 472 (holding constitutional the Maine Clean Election Act).
348. Id. at 455.
349. Id. at 456-57.
350. Id. at 458.
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constitutionally permissible in Nixon, were not so different in kind as to
make them unconstitutional. 351
In Vermont Right to Life Committee v. Sorrell,352 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held unconstitutional three provisions of
the 1997 Vermont Campaign Finance Reform Act that required disclo-
sure of payment for all political advertisements and a similar reporting
requirement. 353 Section 2882 required disclosure of "'[a]ll political
advertisements' which section 2881 define[d] as 'communications . . .
which expressly or implicitly advocate the success or defeat of a
candidate."' 354 The court found that the term "implicitly" extended
the reach of the disclosure requirement to advocacy speech associated
with public issues. 355 The court stated that usage of the word "implicit-
ly" did not set forth what is permissible and what is impermissible
speech under the act. 356 Therefore, the court found that the sections
violated the First Amendment and were unconstitutional. 357
In Landell v. Sorrell358 the United States District Court for the
District of Vermont, in determining the constitutionality of the 1997
Vermont Campaign Finance Reform Act, held that a $2,000 limitation on
contributions to political parties was constitutional but that a limit on
contributions from political parties to candidates was unconstitutionally
low. 359 The court followed a similar analysis to Nixon in distinguishing
expenditures from contributions for constitutional purposes. 360
351. Id. at 458-59. The court also discussed the fact that campaigns in Maine are less expensive
than similar campaigns in other states. Id. at 459. The court deemed this an important factor in
determining a permissible contribution amount to limit. Id.
352. 221 F.3d 376 (2d Cit. 2000).
353. Vt. Right to Life Comm., 221 F.3d at 392.
354. Id. at 387.
355. See id. (finding, therefore, that it violated the rule created in Buckley and Nixon).
356. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo 424, U.S. 1,41 (1976)). The court clarified by stating
A person seeking to communicate his or her point of view on a public issue--to engage
in classic issue advocacy--cannot know in advance whether the State will read the
communication to be an implicit endorsement of a candidate who, to a greater or lessor
extent, agrees with or supports actions that conform to the speaker's view and will
therefore be subject to penalty under the statute.
Id.
357. Id. at 392.
358. 118 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Vt. 2000).
359. Landell, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 493.
The challenged statutes limit[ed] contributions to candidates for Vermont office in a
two-year election cycle to $200 for state representative, $300 for state senator, and $400
for governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, state auditor, and
state attorney general. Contributions from a single source, political party, or political
committee to political committees or political parties [were] limited to $2000. VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 2805(a) and (b).
Id. at 462.
360. Id. at 477-78. The court, when discussing the differences between justifications for
expenditure and contributions restraints, interestingly discussed the fact that Buckley never directly
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The court stated that because parties play such an important role in
our system, contribution limitations from them to candidates "deserve
especially careful attention." 36 1 The district court found that although
Nixon does not directly answer the question of whether contribution
limitations on political parties are to be guided by the same standards
associated with contributions limitations on individuals, Nixon does
answer the question indirectly. 362 The court found the answer by
examining Nixon's discussion of how the constitutionality of a contribu-
tion limit is focused on the
type of financial support being given to the candidate, not the
identity of the contributor: "Restrictions on contributions
require less compelling justification than restrictions on inde-
pendent spending." . . . Because [Shrink] expressly approved
Missouri's claimed interests in limiting individual contribu-
tions, it follows that the state's corresponding limits on political
parties must also be upheld as long as the same rationale
applies and they meet the criteria set out in [Shrink].363
The court then stated the test, holding that "[1]imits on contribu-
tions from parties to candidates-like from individuals to parties-can-
not be so radical in effect as to render political association between
parties and candidates ineffective." 364  It then examined the 1997
contribution limits of $400, $300, and $200 on parties and found those
amounts stringent considering Vermont's small political scale. 365 The
court stated that parties speak differently than individuals. 366 It held that
the contribution limits would "reduce the voice of political parties to an
undesirable, and constitutionally impermissible, whisper." 367 It found
those limits were too low to be constitutionally permissible.368
The court also held that the Vermont Campaign Finance Reform
Act of 1997, that limited contributions from individuals to candidates,
was constitutional. 369 However, the court found the act's expenditure
limits unconstitutional. 370
held that corruption or the appearance of it, were the only acceptable compelling governmental
interests. Id. at 477 (citing Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1976)). The court found, therefore,
that Buckley did not end the possibility for new compelling governmental interests. Id. at 477-78.
361. Id. at 486.
362. Id. at 487.
363. Id. (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387 (2000)).
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 493.
370. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The division of the Court in Nixon, both on the standards used and
on the result, demonstrates why the issue of campaign finance reform
will likely continue to be a battle in the judiciary. While the issue has
gained attention at the national level with proposed McCain-Feingold
and Shays-Meehan campaign finance reform bills, the issue is arguably
more divisive at the individual state level which will further test the
constitutional boundaries of free speech and financial involvement in
elections. 371 As campaign finance reform continues to be an important
societal and legislative concern, a great deal of judicial examination is
likely to continue.
Ryan Cheshire*
371. See Demanding a Vote on Reform, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2001, at 18 and Jim Drinkard,
McCain Confident Bill will be Back Before House, USA TODAY, July 16, 2001, at A6 (discussing the
status of the major campaign finance reform bills).
* I would like to thank Professor Alexander J. Bott, Research Editor Matt Kipp, and the rest of
the North Dakota Law Review editors for their help and guidance.
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